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 1 
THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF MEYER AND PIERCE  
FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES INVOLVING EDUCATION 
 
by 
 
William G. Ross* 
 
The appropriate relationship between government and parents in the education of 
children is an issue that has created recorded controversy since Plato advocated the 
communal rearing of children.  The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue in two 
landmark decisions during the 1920s in which the Court forcefully declared that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to direct the 
education of their offspring.1 
In the first case, Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, the Court held that several state 
statutes prohibiting the teaching of German to elementary school children interfered with 
“the power of parents to control the education of their own.”2  The statutes, enacted in the 
wake of the First World War for the stated purpose of ensuring the assimilation of German-
Americans who lived in isolated ethnic enclaves, were motivated in large measure by the 
nativism and xenophobia that swept the nation in the years immediately following the war.3  
                                                 
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. A.B., Stanford, 1976; J.D., 
Harvard, 1979. Professor Ross is the author of a book about the Meyer and Pierce decisions, 
FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM , EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 (1994). 
1 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925). 
2 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.  
3 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM , EDUCATION, AND THE 
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 2 
The Court’s opinion observed that the Platonic guardianship of children was at odds with 
American concepts of liberty.4  In its earliest recognition that due process embraces human 
rights as well as economic rights, the Court in Meyer observed in dictum that “the 
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”5  Although the Court 
explained that the meaning of liberty within the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be defined 
“with exactness," the Court declared that these liberties include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, “the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children.”6  These are moving 
words – among the most eloquent in the Court's canon. Their meaning, however, remains 
enigmatic.   
In the second case, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters in 1925, the Court struck down 
an Oregon statute that required all children to attend public elementary school.  The law, 
which was part of a national campaign for compulsory public elementary education, was 
animated by anti-Catholicism and probably would have resulted in the closing of all 
comprehensive non-public schools since few parents would have sent their children to both 
full-time public and private schools.7  The Court held that the statute “unreasonably 
                                                                                                                                                             
CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 57-95 (1994). 
4 262 U.S. at 401-02. 
5 Id. at 401. 
6 Id. at 399. 
7 See ROSS, supra note 3, at 134-59. 
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interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control.”8  The Court explained that:  
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State 
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of 
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.9 
 
Despite their ringing declarations about human rights, Meyer and Pierce were both 
formally decided largely on the basis of property rights -- the liberty of the schools to 
conduct a business, the right of private school teachers to follow their occupation, and the 
freedom of the schools and the parents to enter into contracts.10  Although the Court easily 
could have decided the cases on the bases of freedom of religion or freedom of speech,11 
the Court had not yet incorporated any part of the Bill of Rights into state law, and it was not 
 prepared to begin the process of incorporation in these cases.12 
                                                 
8 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
9 Id. at 535. 
10 See ROSS, supra note 3, at 186-87.  
11 As Justice Kennedy recently observed, “Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent 
times, may well have been grounded upon First Amendment principles protecting freedom of speech, 
belief, and religion.”  Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2076 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
12 ROSS, supra note 3, at 189-91. Meyer and Pierce may be seen as a bridge to incorporation, 
however, insofar as they were, for all practical purposes, the first decisions in which the Court struck 
down state legislation that interfered with personal liberties.  The Court began the process of 
incorporation only seven days after it decided Pierce when it stated in dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and the press is 
3
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The Court’s reliance upon substantive due process was consistent with its suspicion 
of  social and economic regulatory legislation.  But while the Court rejected the arguments 
of the states that only public education could instill democratic values in children, the Court 
did not deny that the states had a compelling need to foster such values in youth.  This 
accommodation of the rights of the parents and the needs of the state seemed to strike an 
appropriate balance at the time, and the decisions received widespread popular approval, 
for they seemed to offer something to everyone.13  Ethnic Americans hailed the decision as 
a strike against nativism,14 liberals welcomed the Court’s defense of human rights,15 and 
economic conservatives correctly perceived that the decisions would discourage growing 
efforts by progressives to curb the Court’s power.16  Coming at a time when the nativism 
that had motivated the statutes was waning, the decisions abruptly terminated a 
widespread compulsory public education movement.  
                                                                                                                                                             
incorporated into state law. See ROSS, supra note 3, at 191-97. 
13 Although Pierce was unanimously decided, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and George 
Sutherland dissented in Meyer on the ground that the statutes did not unduly restrict the freedom of 
either the teachers or the students because the laws were a reasonable and perhaps necessary means of 
achieving the desirable state interest of having citizens use a common language.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 3990, 412-13 (1923).  For a discussion of these dissents, see ROSS, supra note 3, at 130-
32.  
14 See ROSS, supra note 3, at 172-73. 
15 Id. at 195-96. 
16 Id. at 193-95.  See also WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES 
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 246-49, 286-87 (1994). 
4
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The decisions may therefore be more controversial today than they were 75 years 
ago. Like many other judicial decisions, Meyer and Pierce have had unforeseen and 
indeed strange doctrinal consequences. Beginning almost immediately after Pierce, the 
Court suspended its use of substantive due process in personal liberties cases in favor of 
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Although, after 1937, the Court rejected even in 
economic cases the substantive due process theory upon which Meyer and Pierce are 
based, the decisions provided the cornerstone for the Court’s revival of substantive due 
process in the context of personal liberties during the 1960s and 1970s.17  The 
conservative Lutherans and Roman Catholics who challenged the laws that the Court struck 
down in Meyer and Pierce might not have hailed the Court so heartily for saving their 
schools if they could have known that these decisions would provide the foundation for the 
Court’s enunciation of a right to privacy that culminated in Roe v. Wade.   Cultural 
conservatives today may disdain the use of these decisions in support of abortion rights, 
but they hail Meyer and Pierce as the cornerstone of parental rights.18  Meanwhile, many 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating anti-abortion statute); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating statute that prohibited use of contraceptives). 
18 For example, while this paper was being revised after the conference, courts relied upon 
Pierce in two major decisions involving parental rights.  In Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 
(2000), the U.S. Supreme Court cited Meyer and Pierce to support its decision to invalidate a state 
law that allowed a court to permit grandparents to visit a grandchild more than the parent wished to 
authorize.  See also infra note 72 and accompanying text.  In another recent decision,  the Eleventh 
Circuit cited Pierce’s recognition of the importance of the parent-child relationship in support of its 
decision affirming the dismissal of a claim that the Immigration and Naturalization Service denied due 
process to a six-year-old alien by dismissing his asylum application as void on the ground that the minor 
lacked the capacity to seek asylum without his father’s consent.  Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 
5
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liberals who may approve of the privacy doctrines for which Meyer and Pierce provide the 
foundation believe that the decisions unduly diminish the rights of children.  From a feminist 
perspective, some scholars have criticized the decisions for reinforcing patriarchy.19  
Few critics of Meyer and Pierce today are motivated by the antagonism against 
ethnic Americans and Roman Catholicism that animated the legislation that Meyer and 
Pierce nullified.  Like the proponents of that legislation, however, some people today 
continue to view non-public schooling with suspicion because they believe that non-public 
education tends to promote racial, economic, and cultural divisiveness that contravenes the 
interest of both the state and the child.  
Some critics of private education have even gone so far as to revive the prospect of 
compulsory public education.  These critics point out that the decisions were based in part 
upon a now-discredited theory of economic due process.  Moreover, they remind us that 
there may have been more latitude for parental control over education during the 1920s, 
when education was less important than it is today.  Stricter enforcement of truancy laws, 
racial integration of schools, and abolition of child labor are all expressions of changed 
attitudes toward education's importance.  Mark Tushnet has suggested that the shaky 
                                                                                                                                                             
(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2737 (2000).  See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE 239-40 (1982); ROSS, supra note 3, at 190-91. 
19 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM . & MARY L. REV. 995, 996-1001, 1112-22 (1992).  Professor 
Woodhouse has argued that the decisions aggrandize private rights at the expense of community values 
and constitutionalized “a patriarchal notion of parental rights” that “interrupted the trend of family law 
moving toward children’s rights.”  Id. at 1113. 
6
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substantive due process grounds on which Pierce is based might permit Congress, 
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit private schools on the 
ground that they unduly interfere with “society’s ability to reach a point of integration where 
judgments about people’s worth are made solely on the basis of individual merit.”20  
Similarly, Abner Greene has stated that compulsory public education “would ensure that all 
children are exposed to multiple sources of authority and knowledge” and “would free up 
funds used for private schooling and would direct parental energies at improving the public 
schools.”21  And James S. Liebman has suggested that public education be compulsory to 
the extent that parents who have religious objections could elect to remove their children.22 
These criticisms of Pierce are part of a broader assault on parental rights.  
Professor James G. Dwyer has argued that parental child-rearing rights are illegitimate 
                                                 
20 Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Difference?, 
1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54 (1991).  Professor Tushnet contends that “[t]hat justification is more 
substantial than the one offered in Pierce, and it might be sufficient to overcome the weakened 
protection given substantive due process rights by the Court’s analysis” in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state statute prohibiting sodomy). 
21Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers are Unconstitutional, and Why They’re Not, 13 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 397, 407 (1999). 
22 James S. Liebman, Voice Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 307 (1991) (reviewing JOHN E. 
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990)).  Professor 
Liebman explains that “[b]y curtailing exit from public schools except by the few citizens whose religious 
beliefs require them to exit organized society, the states could stem enough . . . escape to promote 
genuine voice-activated educational reform and simultaneously extend a civic education to all young 
people whose coming participation in the larger society requires it.”  Id. 
7
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and that parents should enjoy only a “legal privilege to care for and make decisions on 
behalf of children in ways that are not contrary to the children’s best interests.”23 
Contemporary criticisms of Meyer and Pierce, however, do not diminish the 
enduring significance of the decisions for human rights.  Even though the Court abandoned 
economic due process after 1937, the Court’s growing solicitude for personal liberties 
indicates that the Court would reach the same result today.  Now, however, a court would 
probably hold that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause compels the state to 
permit parents to have the option to send their children to a sectarian school.  To the extent 
that the right of parents to prefer a sectarian school to a public school is now presumably 
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, that right is probably more secure than it was at 
the time of Pierce.  Insofar as a parent’s right to send his child to a private, non-sectarian 
school must remain grounded in generic due process, however, the right is vulnerable to 
complaints against the non-textual vagueness of substantive due process.  In contrast to 
Meyer's attorney, who in his autobiography hailed the Meyer decision for its vision of a 
"fenceless land of liberty,"24 many critics of the opinion would prefer to confine liberty within 
at least some fences, particularly if the Supreme Court is going to be the ultimate surveyor 
of liberty’s terrain.  
                                                 
23 James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994).  See also JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS 
SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1998). 
24  ROSS, supra note 3, at 192 (citing ARTHUR F. MULLEN, WESTERN DEMOCRAT 226 
(1940)). 
8
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Although substantive due process invites excessive judicial activism, and even 
though courts during the past twenty years have exhibited little willingness to expand the 
parameters of substantive due process, the doctrine that there are certain rights that are 
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution seems likely to remain secure because there 
are certain unwritten rights that most Americans believe to exist.  If indeed there are any 
fundamental rights that are not spelled out in the Constitution, then many persons – myself 
included – would count among these the right of a parent to exercise a high level of control 
over a child’s education, for child-rearing involves the most intimate aspects of one’s life 
and is a critical expression of personal autonomy.  
The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed the vitality of Meyer and Pierce in its 
decision in Troxel v. Granville, which nullified a Washington statute that permitted state 
courts to exercise broad discretion to override parental decisions concerning the visits of 
third parties with their children.25  Citing Meyer and Pierce, Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion declared that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 26 
But while Troxel demonstrates the continuing significance of Meyer and Pierce, it 
also illustrates the continuing enigma of those decisions.  Although Justice Kennedy 
correctly pointed out in his dissent that all of the Justices seemed to agree that a “custodial 
                                                 
25 Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000). 
26 Id. 
9
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parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how 
best to raise, nurture and educate the child,”27 various members of the Court interpreted 
this right in different ways.  Both the four-justice plurality opinion and Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion relied heavily upon Meyer and Pierce to argue that parents have a 
powerful interest in controlling their children’s personal associations.28  As Justice Souter 
acknowledged in his concurring opinion, however, the Court’s decisions “have not set out 
exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his 
child.”29  Therefore, it is not surprising, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence, 
in which he argued in favor of strict scrutiny, that the opinions of the Court and of Justice 
Souter did not articulate a standard of review for legislation that interferes with the parental 
rights enunciated by Meyer and Pierce.30 
                                                 
27 Id. at 2076 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 2060; id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring).  As Justice Souter stated: 
 
Meyer’s repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham if it failed to 
encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by “any party” at “any 
time” a judge believed he “could make a ‘better’ decision” than the objecting parent had 
done.  The strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associates is as obvious 
as the influence of personal associations on the development of the child’s social and 
moral character. 
 
Id. at 2066-67.  Souter also concluded that Pierce implied that “parental choice in such matters is not 
merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government’s designation of an 
official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.”  Troxel, 120 S. 
Ct. at 2067. 
29 Id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring). 
30 Id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
10
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Although Justice Scalia’s dissent acknowledges that parents have fundamental 
rights to “direct the upbringing of their children,” Justice Scalia contends that the Court 
lacks power to nullify legislation that infringes on those rights.31  Pointing out that Meyer, 
Pierce, and Wisconsin v. Yoder32 are the only decisions in which the Court had relied “in 
whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children,” Justice Scalia contends that the “sheer diversity” of the opinions in Troxel 
persuaded him that “the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying [Meyer, Pierce, 
and Yoder] has small claim to stare decisis protection.  A legal principle that can be 
thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is 
not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance.”33  Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent argues that, while the principle of parental rights as articulated by Meyer and 
Pierce exists “in broad formulation,” the “courts must use considerable restraint, including 
careful adherence to the incremental instruction given by the precise facts of particular 
cases, as they seek to give further and more precise definition to the right.”34 
While Pierce therefore clearly provides a constitutional foundation for some type of 
parental rights, the scope of those rights remains unclear.  Certainly parental rights are far 
                                                 
31 Id. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that enforcement of state law requiring school attendance past 
the eighth grade violated the free exercise rights of the Amish). 
33 Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia also observed that Meyer and 
Pierce were “from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated.”  Id. 
34 Id. at 2076. 
11
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from absolute.  Clearly there are some limits on a parent’s right to control a child’s 
education, or else, as one court has observed, “a truant’s parent could plausibly proclaim 
that he or she was exercising his or her right while ‘home-schooling’ the child to be a safe-
cracker or prostitute.”35 Moreover, the language in Pierce stating that "the child is not the 
mere creature of the state"36 may withhold more parental autonomy than it confers, for the 
use of the word “mere”could be read to suggest that the child is primarily the creature of the 
state.  If the Court had believed that parental powers were generally paramount to 
governmental powers, the Court might have stated that "the child is not primarily the 
creature of the state."37  The Court’s decision in Pierce also declared that the state had the 
right to regulate non-public schools,38 a right that the non-public schools that opposed 
                                                 
35 Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015 (W.D. Tex. 1998) 
(holding that a school district’s policy of requiring students who transferred from non-accredited or 
home schools to pass proficiency tests at their own expense did not burden free exercise of religion). 
36  Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
37 If the Court had regarded the rights of the parent as paramount, the Court likewise might have 
stated that “the child is not the mere creature of the parent,” although there would have been little point 
in using this language since the decision was directed against the power of the state rather than the 
power of the parent.  The Court’s use of the word “mere,” however, must be read in the context of the 
Court’s seemingly broad declaration of parental rights: “those who nurture [the child] and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.”  268 U.S. at 535.  
38 The Court stated that:  
 
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate 
all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to 
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be 
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly 
essential to good citizenship be taught, and that nothing be taught which is 
12
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compulsory education had acknowledged and indeed emphasized in support of their 
position. 39 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically stated that the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children is actually a “fundamental” right that would 
trigger strict judicial scrutiny of legislation that affects that right.  The determination of the 
scope of the parental right to educate children is further complicated because the Court 
has refused to categorize education itself as a fundamental right.40  Accordingly, there is no 
clear standard of review that a federal court must apply in reviewing legislation that affects 
the rights of parents to direct the education of their children.41  The First Circuit has recently 
pointed out that the Supreme Court “has yet to decide whether the right to direct the 
upbringing and education of one’s children is among those fundamental rights whose 
infringement merits heightened scrutiny.”42  Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held that 
                                                                                                                                                             
manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 
 
268 U.S. at 534. 
39 ROSS, supra note 3, at 163 (citing oral argument in the Pierce case).  Opponents of a 
compulsory public education movement in Michigan during the early 1920s tried to discourage 
campaigns against non-public schools by promoting legislation to require closer state supervision of non-
public schools.  Id. at 140-41.  
40 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
41 As one commentator recently observed, “[c]onfusion and inconsistency reign as to the proper 
standards for judicial review.”  Eric W. Schulze, The Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct the 
Education of Their Children, 138 EDUC. L. REP. 583, 587 (1999). 
42 Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995). 
13
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parents lack a fundamental right to direct their children’s education and that “rational basis 
review is appropriate” in cases in which parents seek to exempt their children from 
educational procedures.43  Although legislation presumably is subject to a heightened 
standard of review when parents claim that public school practices infringe upon their 
religious rights as well as their parental rights, the level of scrutiny even here is unclear.44  
The situation is further complicated by a number of state court decisions that indicate that 
education is a fundamental right under state constitutions.45 
Since both federal and state courts have generally refused to read Pierce as 
conferring a fundamental right upon parents that would trigger strict scrutiny of legislation 
affecting parental rights, parental rights advocates recently have unsuccessfully sponsored 
parental-rights amendments in Congress and in numerous states.  A parental-rights 
amendment was defeated in a 1996 initiative in Colorado by a margin of 58 to 42 
percent.46  These proposed amendments typically track the language of Pierce by 
asserting the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.  Although advocates of amendments based on the language of 
                                                 
43 Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996). 
44 As one commentator has pointed out, when courts are “faced with hybrid claims asserting 
violations of both parental and religious constitutional rights, another layer of inconsistency and confusion 
is added to the judicial mix.”  Schulze, supra note 41, at 596. 
45 See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the 
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 401-02 (2000). 
46 Jean Hellwege, Parents Seek Control Over Children’s Lives in Legislatures, Courts, 
TRIAL, May 1999, at 15. 
14
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Pierce contend that an amendment would merely codify Pierce, such amendments would 
interfere with the subtle balance between parental rights and the rights of the state which 
have been worked out since Pierce by impeding efforts to curtail child abuse and providing 
more impetus for school vouchers.47  A parental-rights amendment also would be 
superfluous since many statutes already contain parental-rights provisions.48 
Moreover, such amendments might unduly interfere with the power of school officials 
to make curriculum decisions and provide parents with a virtual veto over curriculum that 
they find objectionable.  This would allow a minority of parents the power to overrule the 
decisions of elected officials, thereby substituting a crude form of direct democracy for 
republican government.  Such a veto power would interfere with the curricular preferences 
of a majority of parents, thereby interfering with their right to direct their children’s education 
                                                 
47 Judith Schaeffer, Deputy Legal Director for People for the American Way, has stated that 
“[a] blanket constitutional amendment that says parents have a constitutional right to direct the 
upbringing of their children sounds innocuous, but it’s a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  Good parents don’t 
need it, and bad parents would abuse it.”  Id. at 13-14. 
48 For example, Texas law provides specific rights to parents, including the right to review all 
teaching materials used in the classroom, the right to file a grievance to be heard by the school board, 
and a limited right of prior consent before a child may be videotaped by a school employee.  TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.001-26.012 (West 1995). 
15
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by sending them to public schools.49  These amendments also might violate the 
constitutional rights of teachers to teach and students to learn.50  
Similarly, the amendments would pose a perennial threat of litigation that would tend 
to encourage school administrators to dilute the curriculum, reaching for the lowest 
common denominator of public sensibilities.51  The danger of more litigation might be 
particularly potent because a parental-rights amendment might shift the standard of judicial 
scrutiny of governmental interference with parental rights from the “rational basis” standard 
that is presently used in most cases to an intermediate standard, or even to a compelling-
interest test. 
In the absence of a more compelling standard of review of government action that 
affects parental rights, Pierce has generally not enabled public school parents to persuade 
courts to permit them to remove their children from practices and programs to which they 
object.52  The Supreme Court’s anomalous decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder is the only 
                                                 
49 See Jennifer L. Sabourin, Note, Parental Rights Amendments: Will a Statutory Right to 
Parent Force Children to “‘Shed Their Constitutional Rights’ at the Schoolhouse Door?,” 44 
WAYNE L. REV. 1899, 1917, 1920, (1999).  As Ms. Sabourin has pointed out, “[p]arents only have a 
constitutional right in directing their own children and not the children of other parents.” Id. at 1920. 
50 Id. at 1923. 
51 Id. at 1920. 
52 As one commentator has observed, “[t]he federal courts narrowly have restricted Meyer, 
Pierce, and Yoder to the facts of those cases.  The courts are unwilling to grant parents any general 
power to select the educational requirements with which they will or will not comply, under the rubric of 
the constitutional right of parents to direct the education of their children.”  Schulze, supra note 41, at 
596. 
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education decision in which Pierce has been successfully invoked.  In one much publicized 
case in which parents objected to a sexually-explicit AIDS awareness assembly that their 
children were required to attend, the First Circuit stated that Pierce does not provide “a 
fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they 
have chosen to send their children . . . .   If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right 
to dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to 
cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with 
the school’s choice of subject matter.”53  In other similar decisions, federal courts have held 
that parents of public school children had no constitutional basis for objecting to the 
administration of psychological counseling to a third grader;54 the imposition of corporal 
punishment on a sixth grader;55 a mandatory sex education program;56a compulsory 
community service program;57 mandatory academic achievement testing;58 and a period 
for silent meditation or prayer not exceeding one minute.59 
                                                 
53 Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995).   
The Court declared that “[w]e cannot see that the Constitution imposes such a burden on state 
educational systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents as described by Meyer and Pierce 
do not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in the public schools.”  Id. at 
534. 
54 Newkirk v. East Lansing Pub. Sch., 57 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1995). 
55 Baker v. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294, 299 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff’d without opinion, 423 U.S. 
907 (1975). 
56 Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F.Supp. 340, 344 (D.C. Md. 1969), aff’d, 428 F.2d 
471, 472 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
57 Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Courts also have rejected parental objections to public school practices and 
curriculum even in cases in which parents have relied both on parental rights and the free 
exercise of religion.  In its controversial decision in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of 
Education, the  Sixth Circuit, for example, rejected efforts by parents to have their children 
opt out of reading a textbook that contained passages that were deeply offensive to 
fundamentalist Christians.  The Court held that mere exposure to this curriculum did not 
unconstitutionally burden the free exercise of religion.60  
One of the most troubling aspects of Mozert is that the curriculum that the parents 
challenged may have marginalized the religious beliefs of the parents because its 
numerous references to religion virtually ignored Christianity, particularly Protestantism.  
Two of the judges on the panel aptly expressed regret that the school board could not have 
done more to accommodate the needs of the parents who objected to the curriculum.  
Nevertheless, they rather ruefully acknowledged that the parents’ remedy was political 
rather than judicial.  As one of the judges explained, “[a] constitutional challenge to the 
content of instruction . . . is a challenge to the notion of a politically-controlled school 
system.”61  
                                                                                                                                                             
58 Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F.Supp. 2d 1012, 1017 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
59 Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337, 346 (D. Mass. 1976). 
60 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
61 Id. at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
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It is not difficult to collect examples of public school curricula to which reasonable 
parents might object.  To one degree or another, many schools have succumbed to the 
latest trends in political correctness and/or to promoting sexual license.  All too many 
criticisms of the public schools, however, begin with an anecdote about a loony curriculum 
and conclude with the non sequitur that public schools as a class are irredeemably 
depraved.  Curricular abuses are inevitable when tens of millions of children attend tens of 
thousands of public schools.  While many parents clearly have legitimate objections to 
public school curriculum, the ability of the political system to accommodate parental 
concerns about public school curriculum is demonstrated by the fact that  the percentage of 
students enrolled in private schools has decreased among all economic groups during the 
past twenty years.  As one commentator recently observed, “[i]f Americans now vote with 
their feet, they typically do so by moving toward public schools, not away from them.”62  The 
continued strength of the public school is all the more remarkable since the burgeoning 
prosperity of the past two decades has made parents more capable than ever before of 
paying for non-public education. 
In some ways, the public schools have been the victims of their own success, for 
their increasing ability to draw and hold children of all abilities and social classes has 
created cultural tensions.  As Professor Minow has observed, “the disillusionment with the 
public schools began at just about the same time that these schools took on the task of 
                                                 
62 Richard Rothstein, Lessons; An Allegiance to Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, 
at B11. 
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educating all children, including those with disabilities and limited English proficiency, non-
citizens, the homeless, and migrants.”63  Critics of the public schools should beware the 
danger of succumbing to the “Miniver Cheevey syndrome” by romanticizing a golden age of 
public education that never existed.  The public schools of yore were not necessarily more 
orderly or educationally efficient than are today’s institutions, and their classrooms were 
segregated by race and were devoid of the physically and mentally challenged as well as 
many of the poor, particularly those children who sacrificed formal education to labor in 
factories, farms, and mines.  
The argument that parents lack sufficient control over the education that their 
children receive in public schools is quite ironic since the public school is probably more 
amenable to grassroots democracy than is any other arm of government.  Parents 
obviously could assert more control over the public schools if they became more involved in 
parent-teacher organizations or school board elections.  At the very least they could vote in 
school board elections – a right  that only approximately ten percent of all parents now 
exercise.64  Since parents constitute a numerically large and generally prosperous 
segment of the electorate, they obviously are no discrete and insular minority.  Although 
parents therefore have the power to influence political decisions concerning school 
                                                 
63 Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of 
Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 503 (1999). 
64 Hellwege, supra note 45, at 15. 
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curriculum, they also have vast ability to influence legal proceedings involving curricular 
issues.65 
Moreover, the ability of parents to influence the schools that their children attend 
may be expanding.  Educators have long since rejected the model of centralization in the 
hands of educational experts, the so-called “one best system.”  Some schools are now 
using so-called school-based management initiatives, which delegate decision-making 
authority over budget, personnel, and curriculum to councils of teachers, parents, and 
administrators at the local level.66    Other reformers have suggested the creation of a so-
called community engagement dialogic model, analogous to the process of alternative 
dispute resolution, in which a mediator would attempt to engage parents in a deliberative 
process that would work out compromises that would be broadly acceptable to various 
competing factions of parents, administrators, teachers, and students.67  Throughout the 
nation, local school districts seem increasingly willing to hear and, when possible, 
accommodate the needs and concerns of parents.  Charter schools, despite some 
drawbacks, also offer exciting possibilities for improving public education through 
initiatives that allow parents to exercise more control over their childrens’ education.68 
                                                 
65 Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Passing of the Cardozo Generations, 34 AKRON L. REV. (in this 
volume). 
66 Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A 
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 102 (1996). 
67 Id. at 114-68. 
68 See Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 
34 AKRON L. REV. (in this volume). 
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Indeed, the ability of parents to influence public school boards may, in many 
instances, actually provide parents with more control over their children’s education than 
they would have if they sent their children to private schools.  The burgeoning of the home-
school movement suggests in part that many parents believe that even private schools do 
not provide parents with sufficient control over their children’s education.  At the very 
minimum, parents who send children to private schools must acquiesce at least in part to 
practices or curricula of which they do not wholly approve.  To the extent that parents are 
not able to effect changes in the public schools, they retain the right under Pierce to remove 
their children from the public schools even though the exercise of this right has obvious 
costs.  
In addition to ignoring the political rights of parents, discussions of parental rights to 
direct their children’s education also tend to overlook the rather obvious fact that parents 
have a vast opportunity to educate their children when school is out of session – as it is 
most of the time. American children attend school only approximately six hours per day, five 
days per week, 36 weeks per year.  This means that more than 80 percent of a child's 
waking hours is spent away from school.  During this time, parents have almost complete 
control over the company in which their children will spend their time and the type of 
influences to which the child will be exposed.   Moreover, parents have full control of a 
child’s education during the first five years of a child’s life – the years that presumably are 
the most formative in a child’s life.  It is a misnomer to equate education with institutional 
schooling; most schooling is home schooling.  The home especially provides a forum for 
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transmitting cultural values that is at least as effective as the school, since so much of the 
time of public and non-public schools is taken up with technical learning that lacks any 
specific value content – for example, phonics and arithmetic.  To the extent that parents 
object to the public school curriculum (without objecting so much that they wish to remove 
their children from public school), they have ample opportunity to provide antidotes at home 
and in their religious institutions during evenings, weekends, holidays, and summers. 
The opportunities of parents to instill values in their children at home and in their 
religious institutions has long been recognized by persons who have defended the 
Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting prayer in the public schools69 against critics who 
alleged that it would subvert the religious and moral training of youth.  As President John F. 
Kennedy stated in defense of that decision, “we can pray a good deal more at home, we 
can attend our churches with a good deal more fidelity, and we can make the true meaning 
of prayer much more important in the lives of our children.  That power is very much open to 
us.  And I hope that, as a result of this decision, . . . all American parents will intensify their 
efforts at home.”70 
One cannot, of course, deny that schools have a very powerful influence in shaping 
the values of children.  Students obviously react to peer pressure, and they naturally tend to 
respect their teachers.  Even though public school children spend most of their time outside 
of school, they obviously spend a very significant amount of their time in the custody of the 
                                                 
69 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
70 JOHN HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 2 
23
Ross: Parental Rights Issues Involving Education
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 
 
 24 
state.  The power of the state to communicate its values to public school children has 
influenced Stephen Gilles’s interesting argument that public school instruction is a form of 
parental speech that is protected by the First Amendment and that the laws that the Court 
nullified in Meyer and Pierce constituted restrictions on such speech.71  Although Meyer 
and Pierce obviously recognize that parents have constitutional rights to exercise control 
over the content of their childrens' education, these decisions do not support the theory that 
parents do not delegate some of their autonomy to the state when they send their children 
to public school.  Because it is impossible for the public schools to accommodate all 
parental opinions, a theory that the schools are direct agents of the state would permit 
parents to interfere with public school curricula in a manner that might create a chaotic 
cacophony in public school classrooms.  
Although some parents might argue that they are unable to counter the baneful 
influence of teachers and peers in the public schools, I suspect that most objections to 
public school curricula involve what is omitted rather than what is taught.  In other words, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1969). 
71 Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
937, 1016-22 (1996).  Professor Gilles argues that “[p]arents are no less ‘speakers’ for First 
Amendment purposes when they communicate indirectly with their children through the speech of 
schools, teachers, home tutors, or other educational intermediaries.”  Id. at 1016.   Professor Gilles 
points out that while “[p]arents remain free to teach what they like when their child is in school . . . there 
are only so many hours in the day.  Six hours a day, five days a week, nine months a year, only the 
public school’s values may be communicated to one’s child”  Id. at 1022.  He believes that “[t]his de 
facto prohibition unquestionably constitutes a major curtailment of dissenting parental . . . speech.”  Id.  
Gilles cites Meyer and Pierce in support of his argument.  Id. at 1020-23.  For discussions of other 
theories on how these decisions can be interpreted in terms of free speech, see supra, note 18.  
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the principal objection of parents is not that their children are learning anything harmful, but 
that they are not sufficiently exposed to much that is helpful and healthy.   
For example, I have heard some parents complain that the American history 
curriculum of many public schools devotes so much attention to women and racial 
minorities that it ignores many of the white men who once virtually monopolized the 
curriculum.  Not one of these persons, however, has expressed any objection to having 
children learn about the contributions of women and racial minorities to American history.  
Indeed, they are happy that the schools are finally teaching about the contributions of 
persons and groups whom the public schools unfairly ignored for so long.  Their quarrel is 
strictly one of emphasis.  They do not feel that their children are learning too much about 
George Washington Carver, but they wish that they would learn more about George 
Washington.  To the extent that these parents are unwilling or unable to persuade the 
school boards to effect the balance that they prefer, they have a rather easy remedy: 
provide instruction at home that fills in the gaps left by the public school curriculum.  I 
suspect, however, that many of the parents who complain the most vociferously about the 
deficiencies of the public schools fail to provide their children with salubrious supplements 
when their children are at home.  Several months ago, the Arts and Entertainment Network 
aired a splendid new film, The Crossing, about Washington’s crossing of the Delaware 
River to fight the battle that turned the tide of the American Revolution.  The film celebrated 
patriotic values in a manner that would warm the most conservative of hearts.  But I would 
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guess that the number of children who were tuned into smutty and vacuous TV and video 
programs was greater than the number who watched The Crossing.  
Moreover, the lamentable decline in the standards of instruction for youth at many 
religious institutions during recent decades provides an example of how many religious 
parents fail to take advantage of opportunities to educate their children outside of the 
public schools.  It is difficult to sympathize with complaints about the cultural deficiencies of 
the public schools when all too many religious institutions fail to adequately instruct young 
people in the morals, doctrines, history, and liturgies of their faith.   
The abundant opportunities for education at home and in private religious 
institutions may explain why many public schools seem to emphasize multi-culturalism 
rather the cultures of the numerically dominant groups in the community.  The schools 
naturally expect the parents to teach the children about their own traditions at home.  If the 
child does not learn about other cultures at school however, she probably will not learn 
about them at home.  For example, the parents in Mozert presumably had considerable 
opportunity to expose their children at home and at church to their Protestant heritage, if 
they had been willing to take the time and make the effort.  It is unlikely, however, that the 
parents would have taught the children much about other traditions if the children had not 
been exposed to these at school.  Although the school’s neglect of the children’s own 
religion may have made the children feel marginalized, the parents presumably could have 
made their children understand that the schools were emphasizing the culture of other 
groups because it was the duty of the parents to instill in them knowledge and pride about 
26
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their own heritage, while the schools had the ability to teach about cultures with which their 
parents were unfamiliar.  
Indeed, the ability of schools to teach students about a wide spectrum of cultures 
was at the heart of Meyer and Pierce, for the proponents of the nativistic legislation in both 
of those cases argued that the parochial schools instilled impressionable youth with alien 
values.  The Court’s decision in Meyer explicitly held that the teaching of German in 
parochial schools did not necessarily promote political subversion or exclude instruction in 
“American” values.72 Similarly, the Court in Pierce implicitly found that religion-based 
schools did not necessarily fail to provide a sound education in secular subjects or neglect 
the inculcation of patriotism.73  As a Nebraska judge quipped at Robert T. Meyer’s trial 
when the state’s attorney asked a pastor whether parochial school graduates could recite 
the national anthem, bilingual children “probably beat us in that.  They can repeat it in two 
languages.”74 
Contrary to the widespread popular assumption that parents surrender to the 
schools most control over children, courts have recognized that parents retain primary 
control over their children in decisions that have refused to find that public schools have an 
                                                 
72 Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 400, 402 (1923). 
73 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
74 ROSS, supra note 3, at 133 (citing Transcript of Proceedings, Nebraska District v. 
Evangelical Lutheran Synod, et al., District Court of Dodge County, Sept. 1, 1921). 
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affirmative duty to protect children from harm.75  As the court explained in one decision that 
the parents of public schoolchilren: 
still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and caring 
for the child.  By mandating school attendance for children under the age of 
sixteen, the state of Illinois has not assumed responsibility for their entire 
personal lives; these children and their parents retain substantial freedom to 
act.  The analogy of a school yard as a prison may be a popular one for 
school-age children, but we cannot recognize constitutional duties on a 
child’s lament.76 
 
In addition to their relevance to current struggles over parental rights amendments 
and curriculum issues, Meyer and Pierce also may be germane to the present controversy 
over school vouchers.  Voucher advocates appear eager to bring vouchers within the 
umbrella of the parental rights enunciated by Meyer and Pierce.77  For example, the 
Milwaukee school voucher program that was recently sustained by a Wisconsin court78 is 
formally called “the Milwaukee Parental Choice program,” thereby perhaps suggesting that 
vouchers permit parents to exercise a constitutional right to choose the school that their 
child attends.  Some voucher proponents argue that economically disadvantaged parents 
                                                 
75 D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., Nos. 91-1136, 91-1137, 1991 WL 
276292, at *6 (3rd Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), vacated, 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992); J.O. v. Alton 
Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).  Courts in both decisions dismissed 
lawsuits by parents whose children allegedly suffered sexual abuse in a public school.  
76 909 F.2d at 272.  Accordingly, the court concluded that “[s]choolchildren are not like mental 
patients and prisoners such that the state has an affirmative duty to protect them.”  Id. at 272-73. 
77 As one commentator has argued, Pierce “clearly recognizes the right of choice implicit in the 
school vouchers system.”  Jill Jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and 
Viability of an Educational Choice or Voucher System, 1993 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 126, 130. 
78 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998). 
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are unable to avail themselves of the right to direct their childrens’ education insofar as they 
cannot afford to send their children to a parochial school.79  But while Pierce indeed 
permits parents to choose where to send their children to school, the Constitution does not 
compel the state to pay for any form of private education, and it may actually prohibit the 
state from paying for parochial education.  
Although the Supreme Court has, in several instances, removed financial 
impediments to the exercise of rights,80 the Court has held that the government has no 
obligation to provide funding to facilitate the exercise of a fundamental right.81  Similarly, 
the Court has established that the failure to subsidize a fundamental right does not 
constitute a penalty on the exercise of that right. 82  
In particular, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no right to abortion 
funding.83  The constitutional argument in favor of vouchers for private education is weaker 
                                                 
79 As one commentator has argued, the only parents “who have a meaningful capacity to 
exercise their right of choice are those who have the financial means to afford private schooling (or the 
time to invest in home schooling) . . . .  The public education system thus poses a great danger of 
infringing on the liberty of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.”   Andrew A. 
Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education Toward Religion: Why Parental 
Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 733-34 
(1997). 
80 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating fee for filing divorce 
petition). 
81 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). 
82 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 & 
n.19 (1980). 
83 See 500 U.S. 173; Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); 448 U.S. 
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than any argument in favor of public funding of abortion insofar as the Court has denied 
(however unfortunately) that education is a fundamental right.84  Moreover, a parent who 
receives no funds for private schooling is nevertheless able to secure public schooling for 
her child, while denial of public funding for a woman’s abortion may completely foreclose 
the exercise of her right. 
Vouchers have only an attenuated connection to the parental rights and interests 
that Meyer and Pierce – and Yoder – were intended to protect.  Even though Meyer and 
Pierce did not directly address the free exercise implications of these cases, the laws that 
the Court nullified in those decisions interfered with the freedom of parents to provide a 
religious education for their children.85  Since religious education was inextricably tied to 
ethnic heritage, the statutes struck at the very heart of parental efforts to preserve their 
                                                                                                                                                             
297; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
84 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973). 
85 In Meyer and its companion cases, the parents challenged the constitutionality of the statutes 
because instruction in the German language was necessary to enable children to participate in German-
language Lutheran services.  See ROSS, supra note 3, at 4, 62, 100.  The opponents of the laws based 
their challenges in state court largely on the ground of religious freedom, id. at 100-01, but largely 
ignored religious issues in their arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, presumably because they 
held little hope for the success of these arguments in the absence of the incorporation of the First 
Amendment into state law.  See id. at 117-19.   Similarly, the Roman Catholic opponents of the Oregon 
compulsory public education statute did not emphasize religious freedom issues in their argument before 
the Court, even though religious liberty was the issue that animated most Catholic opposition to the 
statute.  Id. at 169.  Like the opponents of the language laws in Meyer, the Catholics correctly 
perceived that the Court would have little sympathy for religiously-based arguments.  Id. at 169, 189-
91. 
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cultural identity.86   Indeed, the compelling desire of Lutheran and Roman Catholic parents 
to educate their children in schools that propagated their religious faith was what motivated 
the parents to establish those schools and to challenge the statutes.  Likewise, this is what 
sustained them in their long, difficult, and expensive struggle to overturn the laws.  The 
Court’s ruling that parents had a fundamental right to choose the schools that their children 
attended and the subjects that they studied constituted a critical landmark in judicial 
respect for religious freedom and cultural pluralism.  
In contrast, the so-called “choice” that the voucher movement is ostensibly intended 
to promote has no apparent direct relation to the protection of any religious beliefs or the 
preservation of any cultural identity.  Indeed, many parents who are using vouchers insist 
that they would much prefer to send their children to neighborhood public schools.87  
Rather, the announced goal of the voucher movement is to enable parents whose children 
attend sub-standard schools to obtain a better education for their children by providing 
them with the option to transfer to a non-public school.  In other words, vouchers are 
intended to provide economic relief rather than to protect religion or culture.  
Of course, it is not always possible to neatly distinguish between economic and non-
economic issues.  Indeed, the Meyer and Pierce decisions themselves nicely illustrate this 
                                                 
86 See id. at 1-5, passim.  Robert T. Meyer explained to his attorney that he had openly defied 
the Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of German because he had a “‘duty to uphold my religion. 
Teaching the children the religion of their fathers in the language of their fathers is part of that religion.’” 
ROSS, supra note 3 at 4 (citing MULLEN, supra note 24, at 218). 
87 Lynette Clemetson & Joan Raymond, A Ticket to Private School, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 
2000, at 32. 
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point by blurring the distinction between the economic and the non-economic rights of the 
plaintiffs.88   The economic desire of parents to provide a quality education for their children 
has a moral component that perhaps permits it in part to transcend economics.  One might 
even argue that the goal of  parents to provide a quality education for their children is 
morally equivalent to the desire of parents to educate their children in a school that will 
properly transmit their religious and cultural heritage.  One also might argue that the 
violence and lewdness that presumably pervade some public schools grossly offend the 
cultural and spiritual traditions of many of the parents whose children attend these schools. 
 Moreover, school vouchers may help to promote the type of individual autonomy that 
Pierce facilitated.89  Constitutionally, however, there is a gaping difference between 
affirmatively forcing parents to send a child to a public school to which the parents have 
religious objections and merely denying economically impoverished parents public funds to 
send  their children to a non-public school when the doors of the public school house are 
wide open and welcoming.  
Although the non-sectarian schools that were saved by Pierce may not have served 
as similar conduits for cultural identity, the abolition of non-public schools would have given 
the state a complete monopoly over elementary education, thereby truly depriving parents 
of a significant choice about how to educate their children.  In contrast, parents who seek to 
                                                 
88 See ROSS, supra note 3, at 186-88. 
89 See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory: 
Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J. L. & POL. 
411, 451-58 (1998).  
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rescue their children from sub-standard schools and who cannot pay for private schools 
have a number of public options, such as inter-district transfers, charter schools, and 
political reform.  Moreover, parents whose children attend under-funded schools may 
obtain relief through equity funding lawsuits.   
Because school vouchers involve economic issues rather than the questions of 
religious freedom that were at least tacitly present in Meyer and Pierce, advocates of 
school vouchers cannot avail themselves of any of the free exercise elements that are 
implicit in those decisions and on which the Court might have based it rulings if it had been 
ready to incorporate the First Amendment into state law.90  Moreover, since some 
commentators have argued that prohibitions against public funding of sectarian schools 
violates the Equal Protection Clause,91 it might not be wholly implausible to argue that 
vouchers interfere with the free exercise of religion since parental disapproval of the 
religious practices of parochial schools might present a wrenching dilemma for parents 
whose children attend poor schools and are eligible for school vouchers.  In such a 
situation, the parent could face the cruel choice of leaving her child in a materially inferior 
public school or sending the child to a spiritually objectionable parochial school.92  
                                                 
90 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
91 Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 140-
52 (2000); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State 
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 660-61 (1998). 
92 See Minow, supra note 63, at 536.  In discussing contracts between government and 
religious organizations for the provision of welfare services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 604(a), Professor 
Minow observes that “[v]oucher programs may directly burden the right of the destitute and desperate 
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Moreover, vouchers for sectarian schools would also impose disadvantages for parents 
and children who resided in communities in which their own religion did not maintain a 
sectarian school.93  
In addition to interference with free exercise of religion by the persons for whom 
vouchers were intended to assist, vouchers also could have a deleterious impact on the 
religious organizations that received vouchers insofar as vouchers might enable the 
government to increase its regulation of private and sectarian schools.  The fear of 
increased public control of private education has caused the Home School Legal Defense 
Association to oppose government payments for private education.  As an attorney for the 
Association has explained, “vouchers have a terrible potential to disrupt existing free 
market education.”94  The availability of government funds also might diminish the 
willingness of parents to support private and parochial schools.95  Proponents of parochial 
education should not permit vouchers to debilitate the schools that parents and churches of 
the 1920s fought so valiantly to protect in Meyer and Pierce. 
                                                                                                                                                             
individuals to exercise freely their own religion or nonreligion, as the case may be.” Id.  
93 See Kimberly M. DeShano, Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under 
Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 784 
(1999).  As Ms. DeShano points out, exclusion of sectarian schools from a voucher program would 
enable the state to remain religiously neutral “as not all religions have community support to operate their 
own schools.”  Id. at 795. 
94 Scott W. Somerville, The History and the Politics of School Choice, 10 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV. RTS. L.J. 121, 124 (1999-2000). 
95 See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 807, 840-41 (1999).  
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Vouchers also may violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.96  In 
particular, vouchers seem vulnerable under the second prong of the Supreme Court’s so-
called “Lemon test,” which requires that legislation challenged under the Establishment 
Clause have “a primary or principal effect  . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”97 
 The Court’s recent relaxation of the Lemon test in decisions involving aid to parochial 
education98 have caused some commentators to suggest that the Court might be 
sympathetic toward vouchers for attendance at sectarian schools.99  Other commentators 
believe that the adherence to the Court’s existing doctrines would make vouchers for 
sectarian schools unconstitutional.100  The situation is further complicated because the 
                                                 
96 See generally, Lisa H. Thurau-Gray, Trojan Ponies: Undermining the Establishment 
Clause in the Name of ‘Child Benefit Theory,’ 27 J.L. & EDUC. 435 (1998). 
97 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).  The other prongs of the Lemon test 
require that the legislation have a secular purpose and that it not create excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.  Id. 
98 See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (permitting state and federal school aid 
programs to provide material and equipment to parochial schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997) (allowing public school teachers to provide remedial education to parochial school students 
pursuant to federal statute); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing public 
school district to provide sign-language interpreter to deaf student in parochial school); Witters v. 
Washington Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1984) (permitting state to aid blind students at 
sectarian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (sustaining state statute providing tax 
deduction to parents for parochial school tuition, textbooks, and transportation). 
99 See Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 375, 392-97 (1999); Minow, supra note 63, at 518; Greg 
Todd, Fully Participating Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach 
in the Wall of Church-State Separation?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 710, 729-39 (2000).  
100 See Hamilton, supra note 95; Danielle Jess Latham, Note, Wall of Separation or Path to 
Interaction: The Uncertain Constitutional Future of School Vouchers in Light of Inconsistent 
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Court has been closely divided in recent decisions in which it has upheld aid to parochial 
schools, with four justices adhering to a strict interpretation of the second prong of the 
Lemon test.  The voucher issue hinges in part upon the precise manner in which voucher 
plans are framed, particularly since this could determine whether the Court would regard 
vouchers as a form of direct aid to parochial schools or as indirect aid to the extent that 
parents had the discretion to decide whether to use the voucher for a sectarian or a non-
sectarian school.101 
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in 1998 that Milwaukee’s voucher 
program did not violate the Establishment Clause,102 a federal court in 1999 held that 
Ohio’s voucher program contravened the Establishment Clause,103 and the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                             
Developments in Judicial Neutrality Between Church and State, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 432 
(2000). 
101 See David S. Petron, Note, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid 
Distinction in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1257-68 
(2000); Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 185-91 (2000); Martha McCarthy, Religion 
and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 160 (2000). 
102 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998). 
103 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).  In its decision, the 
court rejected several of the arguments that voucher proponents commonly make in support of the 
constitutionality of vouchers.  First, the court found that the program was not unconstitutional merely 
because the program did not directly fund schools, but rather because it merely provided vouchers to 
parents for use mainly at sectarian schools.  Id. at 863.  The court explained that students had “no 
meaningful choice” between religious or secular schools because 82 percent of the schools that 
participated in the voucher program were sectarian.  Id. The court stated that it had not been influenced 
in this conclusion by the fact that 96 percent of participating students had enrolled in religious schools.  
Id. at 865.  The court distinguished Witters, 474 U.S. 484, on the ground that  "nearly all state aid 
under the Voucher program will flow to religious institutions.  It cannot be said that this aid flows to 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss1/6
 
 
 37 
Judicial Court of Maine in 1999 sustained Maine’s exclusion of religious schools from a 
voucher program on the ground that their inclusion would violate the Establishment 
Clause.104 
Even if vouchers are found to be constitutional under the Establishment Clause, 
many state constitutions present impediments to vouchers.  The Supreme Court of 
Vermont has held that a state voucher program violated the state’s equivalent of the 
Establishment Clause.105  A Florida court recently held that Florida’s voucher plan violated 
a state constitutional provision that requires the state to provide “a uniform, efficient, safe, 
secure and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high 
quality education.”106  According to the Florida decision, the voucher program “supplants 
the system of free public schools mandated by the constitution.”107  Other state 
                                                                                                                                                             
those institutions as a result of the choice of the Program beneficiaries since nearly all the schools 
participating are religious."  72 F. Supp. 2d at 855-56. 
The court in Zelman also distinguished the Supreme Court's 1992 decisions in Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), on 
the ground that the Ohio program, unlike the federal programs in Agostini and Zobrest, resulted in the 
receipt of actual funds by the sectarian schools.  72 F. Supp. 2d at 857-60.  Moreover, the court 
emphasized that the Ohio program imposed no limits on the manner in which the funds were to be used. 
 Id. 
104 Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 
(1999). 
105 Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999), cert. 
denied sub nom. Andrews v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., 120 S. Ct. 626 (1999). 
106 Holmes v. Bush, No. CV99-3370, 2000 WL 526364 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000) 
(citing to FLA. CONST. art. IX § 1). 
107 Id. at *7. 
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constitutions contain significant prohibitions against public funding of sectarian schools,108 
and many states enforce their own establishment clauses more restrictively than the federal 
clause is enforced by the federal courts.109  One study has concluded that the states are 
roughly equally divided into three groups: those that have a supportive constitutional 
environment for school vouchers, those that have an unsupportive climate, and those in 
which the outcome would be uncertain.110  The Supreme Court’s growing emphasis on 
federalism indicates that the Court would defer to state prohibitions on vouchers if the 
issue were framed primarily in terms of the Establishment Clause rather than the Free 
Exercise Clause.111  
A state could, of course, exclude sectarian schools from a voucher program.  
Although some commentators have suggested that such an exclusion might run afoul of the 
Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clauses,112 the invalidation of such a statute on either 
                                                 
108 Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON 
CIV. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 137, 162-71 (1998).  For example, most state constitutions require that all 
“public mon[ey] . . . be spent for a public purpose,” and several state constitutions specifically require 
that only public schools receive public money.  Id. at 169; 168.  See also Deshano, supra note 93, at 
778.   
109See DeShano, supra note 93; Kemerer, supra note 108. 
110 Kemerer, supra note 108, at 179. 
111 Id. at 151-53. 
112 See Stephen L. Carter, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: Parents, Religion, and Schools: 
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1218 (1997) (“if the state 
decides to give aid to any private schools at all, to exclude religious schools would be to do just what 
Pierce does not allow: to pressure parents (through the device of a financial penalty) to send their 
children to the religion-destroying schools rather than the religion-affirming ones.”); Heytens, supra note 
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ground “would reverse a trend by the present U.S. Supreme Court to give greater 
deference to state authority.”113 Moreover, the exclusion of sectarian schools from a 
voucher program would enable the state to avoid favoring those denominations that have 
community support for sectarian schools at the expense of those which lack such 
support.114  In its recent decision striking down Cleveland’s voucher program, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio refused to address the state’s contention that 
it would be unconstitutional to exclude religious schools from a voucher program.115  
Congress might try to circumvent such state impediments by enacting a federal school 
voucher statute.  Such a statute might “trump the application of state constitutional anti-
establishment provisions in state court under the federal Supremacy Clause.” 116 
Vouchers are antithetical to the spirit of Pierce insofar as they interfere with the 
delicate balance between public and private education that lies at the core of that decision. 
 The Court in Pierce tacitly rejected the contention of proponents of compulsory public 
                                                                                                                                                             
91 at 153-61 (arguing that exclusion of religious schools from a voucher system would violate equal 
protection); Mark Tushnet, supra note 20, at 51 (“[s]uch an exclusion appears to violate the 
fundamental principle of the religion clauses that a government may not discriminate in favor of or against 
religion in its provision of benefits.”).  
113 Kemerer, supra note 108, at 152.  Professor Kemerer believes that “past decisions suggest 
that the U.S. Supreme Court may allow states to apply their own constitutional provisions to challenged 
voucher programs in the interest of federalism.”  Id. at 179. 
114 See DeShano, supra note 93, at 795. 
115 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 860-61 (1999). 
116 Kemerer, supra note 108, at 152. 
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education that private schools threatened the viability of public education.  As opponents of 
compulsory public education pointed out during the school wars of the early 1920s, non-
public schools helped the public schools insofar as they relieved the state from finding 
extra funds to educate large numbers of students.117  Although Pierce implicitly recognized 
that the private and parochial schools posed no threat to the state that would justify the 
state’s exercise of its police power to destroy these schools, the Court’s opinion in no way 
denigrated public education. Indeed, even opponents of compulsory public education 
seemed to assume that public education represented the norm and non-public education 
the exception – a constitutionally protected and healthy exception, but an exception 
nonetheless.   
In contrast, many proponents of vouchers seem hostile to the very concept of public 
education,118 just as the advocates of the compulsory public education law that the Court 
nullified in Pierce were hostile to any form of private elementary education.  Many voucher 
advocates accept the highly questionable premises that public schools tend to be inferior 
to private ones,119 that poor public schools cannot be improved, and that vouchers would 
                                                 
117 ROSS, supra note 3, at 144, 156.  Opponents of the Oregon school law, for example, 
variously estimated that the state would need between 3.6 and 6 million dollars to construct new schools 
if the statute were upheld, and that the annual cost of educating the 12,000  new pupils would exceed 
one million dollars (about 30 million dollars in today’s money).  Id. at 156. 
118 See Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial 
Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 406-07, passim (1997). 
119 See, e.g., DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS, 
FRAUDS, AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 26 (1995); KEVIN B. SMITH & 
KENNETH J. MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 15-16 
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help raise educational standards.120  In its decisions in Meyer and Pierce, the Court tacitly 
rejected similar arguments about private schools, for antagonists of the parochial schools 
had complained about low standards in such schools. Although some of these complaints 
were justified,121 others were wildly exaggerated,122 just as many of the criticisms of 
today’s public schools may be overwrought.  By emphasizing that the state had the power 
to regulate private education in order to require the maintenance of certain standards, the 
Court in Pierce implied that any deficiencies in private schools did not alone permit the 
state to require compulsory public education.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(1995). 
120 Lynn Olson, New Studies on Private Choice Fan the Flames, EDUC. WK., Sept. 4, 
1996, at 1, 20 (citing conflicting studies regarding performance of students who used vouchers in 
Milwaukee program); Adam Cohen, A First Report Card on Vouchers, TIME, Apr. 26, 1999, at 36 
(discussing Indiana University study that concluded that students who used vouchers to attend 
established private schools slightly outperformed comparable public school students, while students who 
attended schools that had been established for the purpose of accepting vouchers had performance 
levels inferior to public school counterparts). 
121 ROSS, supra note 3, at 48, 78, 102, 140-41.  In Michigan, for example, where voters in 
1920 and 1924 rejected compulsory public education laws, “[t]he Roman Catholic schools had no 
superintendent until 1918, and administration continued to be weak for many years thereafter since the 
superintendent had no office or staff and served also as a parish priest.”  Id. at 141.   Deploring the 
deficiencies in some of the Lutheran schools in Michigan in 1918, a Lutheran “pastor remarked that it 
was ‘small wonder’ that public school officials were ‘not always friendly towards our school system.’”  
Id. (quoting H. Grueber to Theodore Graebner, Oct. 2, 1918, Graebner Papers, Box 122, Concordia 
Historical Institute, Clayton Missouri). 
122 In advocating compulsory public education during the early 1920s, a Florida public school 
teacher argued that any public savings produced by parochial schools were “more than counterbalanced 
by increased public spending for ‘the children’s homes, . . . charity hospitals, insane asylums, courts of 
justice and prisons’ that were needed to accommodate parochial school alumni.”  ROSS, supra note 3, 
at 70 (quoting Walter B. Jernigan, Public Schools in Florida, NEW AGE, Jan. 1923, at 16). 
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Moreover, some advocates of vouchers argue that public schools are presently so 
stratified by race and income that they no longer effectively transmit the civic values that the 
advocates of the common school movement foresaw during the nineteenth century.  
Analogous arguments about private schools were made before Pierce by advocates of 
compulsory public education, who argued that non-public schools created deleterious 
racial, religious, and economic stratifications.123  
Despite the diversity of an increasingly heterogeneous society, it is still possible to 
identify core values to which the overwhelming majority of parents appear willing to 
subscribe.124  To the extent that Americans disagree about values, they are more likely to 
disagree about the manner in which core values should be applied in specific situations 
rather than about the values themselves.  For example, while nearly everyone would agree 
that children should respect their parents, there is considerable disagreement about the 
methods by which parents may discipline children who fail to respect their parents.  
                                                 
123 ROSS, supra note 3, at 71. 
124 Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices 
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 225 (1996). As Professor Salomone has explained:  
 
[a]lthough not intended to be exhaustive, a listing of common values might include a mix 
of character traits such as honesty, integrity, responsibility, delayed gratification, hard 
work, respect for authority, and civic virtue combined with more fundamental political 
principles, particularly justice and fairness, political and religious tolerance, and equality 
in the sense of equal dignity for all.  As a source of these “shared values,” we should 
look to our common history and particularly to the United States Constitution, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and to federal statutory law with supporting 
administrative regulations as statements of majority consensus. 
 
Id. 
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Similarly, while nearly everyone values the virtue of hard work, reasonable persons may 
differ about the extent to which food stamps given to the poor or inheritance taxes imposed 
on the rich encourage or discourage this virtue.  
Some critics of public education also contend that the public schools fail to instill 
virtues, even to the extent that it remains possible to identify such virtues. Notwithstanding 
their shortcomings, however, public schools still help to transmit basic values and to 
promote social cohesion.125  Any deficiencies in fulfilling this mission does not mean that 
public schools are incapable of improvement.  As one commentator has aptly stated: “The 
cry of ‘Fire!’ has been heard in the institution of public education.  Exit should not be the 
only option.  Instead of devoting all resources to finding an exit, the public should find a way 
to extinguish the fire and to preserve a worthy and venerable structure.”126 
                                                 
125 As Professor Dupre argued recently:  
 
[o]ne of the great strengths of the public school institution is its ability to 
encourage social integration. Indeed, this nation may have no other institution 
with the same potential of integrating rich and poor on a daily basis and 
inculcating our commitment to representative democracy while children are 
young and before they become set in their views. Learning to deal with, and 
perhaps even be friends with, children of a different economic, racial, or 
religious background can be an enriching experience for children. 
 
Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 84 (2000). 
126 Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schools a Private Business, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
695, 712 (1999).  This commentator has likewise aptly pointed out that the possibility that “the public 
schools are not meeting the ideal” does not necessarily mean “that the ideal is a bad one.” Id. at 710. 
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Although advocates of vouchers contend that the transfer of money away from 
supposedly inferior public schools will encourage public schools to raise their standards, 
vouchers could have precisely the opposite effect.  Vouchers could relieve public officials 
of political pressure to improve sub-standard schools since they would reduce the number 
of students attending substandard schools and remove from the public schools the very 
students whose parents would be the most likely to seek public school reform.127  
Moreover, the competition argument is flawed insofar as private schools enjoy certain 
competitive advantages over public schools, particularly their far more arbitrary power over 
the selection and retention of students.128  
                                                 
127 As Professor Minow has pointed out, “[t]he immediate consequence of school-choice 
programs will most likely leave the most vulnerable children from the least-engaged and least-solid 
families in the worst schools.”  Minow, supra note 63, at 528.  Likewise, one opponent of school 
vouchers has aptly expressed fear that public schools would be “left only with children with disabilities, 
children of parents who do not care if, or where, their children attend and children who have been 
kicked out of all the private schools.”  Jennifer A. Hendrikson, Comment, Jackson v. Benson: School 
Vouchers – Offering an Apple to Private Schools; Creating a Serpent for Public Schools, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259, 277 (1999) (quoting an opponent of an Oklahoma voucher proposal).  See 
also James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 277-93 (1991)(reviewing JOHN E. 
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1990)). 
128 As one commentator has pointed out, the public choice theory is flawed because:  
 
the public and private schools are not equal in terms of public accountability.  
The public schools must not only adhere to curriculum standards and anti-
discrimination practices, but public schools must also admit every student that 
wishes to attend.  On the other hand, private schools are less accountable to the 
community. Thus, they have more power to choose who to educate. 
 
Hendrikson, supra note 127, at 277. 
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Advocates of vouchers have also failed to explain what will become of public school 
systems that have lost the support of the parents who presumably care most about their 
children’s education.  As one leading sociologist of education has predicted, “In any choice 
plan, the families who have the least resources in terms of information, energy and money 
will be left behind.”129  Moreover, it is unlikely that states will have the means to fund 
vouchers for every parent who wishes to receive one.130 
The slogan of the opponents of compulsory public education during the early 1920s 
was “Whose is the Child?,” a question to which the Court in Pierce provided an answer that 
struck a somewhat ambiguous balance between the rights of the parents and the rights of 
the state.   Perhaps the rallying cry of opponents of school vouchers should be “Education 
is not a commodity.”  It is erroneous to assume that education is amenable to normal 
market forces.  As Professor Liebman has explained, “[o]ne thing markets are not good for 
is allocating public goods, and an educated public is just that.  Accordingly, exit and choice 
will never work well to allocate that good – unless working well means warehousing the 
poor, the less gifted, and the academically disinclined in educational facilities that make 
existing public schools look like the Institute for Advanced Studies.”131 
                                                 
129 Jill Jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and Viability of an 
Educational Choice or Voucher System, 1993 B.Y.U EDUC. & L.J. 126, 146 (1993) (quoting 
Robert L. Crain, a professor of sociology and education at Columbia University Teachers College). 
130 See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the 
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 969 (1998). 
131 Liebman, supra note 127, at 313.  Decrying school vouchers as “recipe for disaster,” 
Professor Liebman argues that voucher plans, regardless of how they are designed, “inevitably will turn 
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The use of Meyer and Pierce by both the proponents and opponents of school 
vouchers illustrates again that these decisions remain enigmatic, controversial, and vital. 
Both decisions compel significant restrictions on the power of the state to interfere with the 
autonomy of parents over the education of their children.  Both decisions also recognize 
that the state has significant power to regulate the manner in which children are educated.  
The decisions therefore must remain controversial in the absence of pure communism or 
pure libertarianism, for there is no obvious or perfect way to balance the competing 
interests of the parents and the state in matters of education in a free, but statist, society. In 
trying to achieve this balance, one might recall W.H. Auden’s observation that civilization is 
a function of “the degree of diversity attained and the degree of unity retained.”132  Parental 
rights involving the education of their children help to promote a diversity that is essential to 
a free society, but the retention of governmental authority in this process helps to assure a 
unity that is no less essential. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the schools into new and more efficient machines for sorting educational consumers into numerous 
homogenized pools of parents and children with the same levels of wealth, intellectual ability, consumer 
sophistication, academic orientation, and ethnicity.  That, after all, is what markets are good for.”  Id. 
132 W.H. AUDEN, FOREWARDS AND AFTERWARDS 9 (1973). 
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